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This paper presents a critical overview of some recent attempts at building formal 
models formalizations of organizations as information-processing and problem-solving 
entities. 
We distinguish between two classes of models according to two distinct objects of 
analysis. The first class includes models mainly addressing information processing and 
learning and analyze the relations between organizational performance, learning 
patterns  and the structure of information flows. The second class includes models 
focusing upon the relationship between the division of cognitive labor and search 
process in some problem-solving space, addressing more directly the notion of 
organizations as repositories of problem-solving knowledge. Here the focus is on the 
problem-solving procedures which the organization embodies.  
The results begin to highlight important comparative properties regarding the impact on 
problem-solving efficiency and learning of different forms of hierarchical governance, 
the dangers of lock-in associated with specific forms of adaptive learning, the relative 
role of “online” vs. “offline” learning, the impact of the “cognitive maps” which 
organizations embody, the possible trade-offs between accuracy and speed of 
convergence associated with different “decomposition schemes”. 
We argue that these are important formal tools towards the development of a 
comparative institutional analysis focusing on the distinct properties of different forms 
of organization and accumulation of knowledge. 
 






This work is meant to offer a critical overview of the achievements and challenges 
ahead facing explicit formalizations of organizations as information-processing and 
problem-solving entities. 
The importance of the information-processing arrangements is well acknowledged 
within both agency and capability-based theories of the firm, even if only the latter 
focuses on the problem-solving features of organizations. 
However, most formal representations of such activities tend to offer highly blackboxed 
accounts.  In that agency models are an extreme case to the point where the whole 
activity of information processing is compressed in some function maximization 
conditional on the appropriate processing of the available information.  On the contrary, 
here we shall survey those endeavours which try to account for organizational 
information processing and problem-solving in terms of explicit sequences of activities 
and procedures nested into specific organizational arrangements prescribing "who send 
which signals to whom" and "who does what and in which sequence". 
The appreciative theories upon which such model draw represent a small – but not 
negligible and growing – minority of the economic profession who place their 
“primitives” of the nature of economic organizations are placed in their problem-solving 
features, in turn nested in ubiquitous forms of human “bounded rationality”, grossly 
imperfect processes of learning and diverse mechanisms of social distribution of 
“cognitive labor”. The root of this approach can be found in the works of Herbert 
Simon, James March, Alfred Chandler and Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter
2. 
  The problem-solving activities of the firm can be conceived as combinations of 
physical and cognitive acts, within a procedure, leading to the achievement of a specific 
                                                 
1 The work draws upon other works of the authors, in particular: Cohen at al. (1996), Dosi, Nelson and 
Winter (2000), Marengo and Dosi (2005), which the reader is referred to for further details. 
2 See Chandler (1977), Cyert and March (1963), March and Simon (1993), Nelson and Winter (1982), Simon 
(1962) and (1981).  
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outcome. Its internal organization determines the distribution of the informational inputs 
across specific task units and, as such, the division of the cognitive labor. The general 
idea is that firms possess the specific problem-solving competencies associated with 
their own operational procedures and routines, in turn embedded into the patterns of 
intra-organizational division of labor and assignments of decision entitlements. 
An illustrious antecedent of this view dates back, indeed,  to Adam Smith’s “Pin 
Factory” example in the Wealth of Nation: 
 
“One man draws out the wire, another straights it, a third cuts it, a fourth 
points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head; to make the head 
requires two or three distinct operations; to put it on, is a peculiar business, 
to whiten the pins is another; it is even a trade by itself to put them into the 
paper; and the important business of making a pin is, in this manner, 
divided into about eighteen distinct operations, which, in some 
manufactories, are all performed by distinct hands, though in others the 
same man will sometimes perform two or three of them.”(Smith, 1776).  
And, relatedly, such patterns of division of labor match specific channels of information 
flows and "lines of command". 
How does one formalize these basic intuitions? 
It is fruitful to distinguish between two classes of models according to two distinct 
objects of analysis. The first class includes models mainly addressing information 
processing and learning. Here the focus is on the relation between organizational 
performance, learning patterns  and the structure of information flows.  Agents are 
adaptive learners who adjust their information processing capability (i.e. their 
knowledge of the environment) through local trial-and-error. 
The second class includes models focusing upon the relationship between the division 
of cognitive labor and search process in some problem-solving space, addressing more 
directly the notion of organization as repositories of problem-solving knowledge. Here 
the focus is on the problem-solving procedures which the organization embodies. After 
all, managing an organization, designing and producing cars or software packages,  
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discovering a new drug, etc. can been seen as complicated problem whose “solutions” 
are made of a large number of cognitive and physical acts. This kind of activities imply 
the coordination of large combinatorial spaces of components. 
At one end, components which make up an artifact can take a number of alternative 
states: so, for example, in the case of the production of a car, one combines different 
characteristics of the engine, alternative designs, different materials etc. Conversely, 
innovative search may be straightforwardly represented in form of combination of 
multiple “cognitive acts” eventually yielding the solution of the problem at hand, e.g. 
the discovery of a new molecule with the required characteristics, a reasonable and 
coherent software package, etc. Note that in both examples the existence of strong 
interdependencies among the components – which often are only partially understood 
by all agents involved - implies that the effect on the system’s performance of a change 
in the state of a single component depends on the values assumed by the other ones.  An 
implication is also that in this kind of problems it is impossible to optimize the system 
by optimizing each single component. 
By applying this view to organizational analysis one can conceive economic 
organizations as bundles of routines, procedures, rules characterized by strong 
interrelations which often are opaque to organizational members. Notice first the partial 
“opaqueness” of the mappings between actions and outcomes is quite in tune with 
“garbage can” interpretation of organizational dynamics (Cohen et al. 1972). Second it 
is well corroborated by plenty of evidence regarding widespread difficult in replication 
and transfers of incumbent organizational arrangement (Winter and Szulanski, 1998, 
2002; Zander and Kogut (1995)). Third, an obvious implication of such partly opaque 
interrelatedness is also that the introduction of a new routine which has proven superior 
in another situation might have negative effects on the performance of the organization 
if other interrelated components are not appropriately co-adapted (Marengo and Dosi, 
2003: 8-9; Marengo et al 2000).   
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2.  Information processing and structural learning 
Marengo (1992) and Marengo (1996) present a model which focuses upon the 
modification of agents’ information processing capabilities, i.e. a process of "structural" 
learning. Individual agents are imperfect adaptive learners, as they adjust their 
information processing capabilities through local trial-and-error. This adaptive learning 
is (at least partly) driven by the information coming from the environment and/or from 
other members of the organization. The model shows that the architecture of such 
information flows plays a crucial role in determining the learning patterns and the 
performance characteristics of the organization. 
One begins by considering a standard problem of individual decision making, which 
will be then extended to a collective one. Let 
 
{ } 12 , ,... N Ss ss =  
 
be the set of the N possible states of nature and 
{ } 12 ,, . . . N Aa aa =  
the set of the k possible actions the decision-maker can undertake. The payoff  to the 
agent is given by a function: 
∏: A×S →R 
 
where the agent's payoff to action ai  when the state of the world sh  occurs will be 
indicated by πih. 
The action the agent chooses depends obviously on the level of his or her knowledge 
about the state of the world. The agent's state of knowledge (or information processing 
capabilities) can be represented by a collection of subsets P(si)⊆ S where P(si) is the set 
of states of the world which the agent considers as possible (or cannot tell apart) when 
the real state is si. 
The basic component of this learning system is a condition-action rule, where the 
execution of a certain action is conditional upon the agent's perception that the present  
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state of the world falls in one of the categories he or she has defined in his \mental 
model. The condition part is a category, that is a subset of the states of the world and is 
activated when the last detected state of the world falls in such a subset. Practically, the 
condition is a string of n symbols (as many as the states of the world) over the alphabet 
{0,1} and it is satisfied whenever the last state of the world corresponds to a position 
where a “1” appears. All in all, the condition: 
 
{ } 12 ... 0,1 N cc c w it h c∈  
 
is satisfied when, if si is the last observed state of the world, we have ci = 1. Thus, a set 
of conditions defines a subset of the power set of S. It is important to notice that each 
condition defines one subjective state (or category) of the world, as perceived by the 
agent and defines its relationship with the objective true states of the world. This 
relationship remains anyway unknown to the decision maker, who knows only the 
subjective states. 
The action part is instead a string of length k (the number of the agent's possible 
actions) over the same alphabet and with the following straightforward interpretation: 
{ } 12 ... 0,1 ki a a a with a ∈  
which has one and only one position which equals “1” and “0's” everywhere else. 
The decision maker can be therefore represented by a set of such condition-action rules: 
{ } 11 2 , ,..., q R RR R =  
where: 
{ } 11 2 1 2 : , ... ... , 0,1 Nk i h Rcc c a a a w i t hca ⇒ ∈  
 
In addition, each rule is assigned a “strength” and a “specificity” measure. 
Strength basically measures the past usefulness of the rule, that is the rule's cumulated 
payoff. Specificity measures the strictness of the condition:  the highest specificity (or 
lowest generality) value is given to a rule whose condition has only one symbol “1” and 
therefore is satisfied when and only when that particular state of the world occurs,  
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whereas the lowest specificity (or the highest generality) is given to a rule whose 
condition is entirely formed by “1's” and is therefore always satisfied by the occurrence 
of any state of the world. 
In this genre of models, at the beginning of each simulation the decision maker is 
supposed to be completely ignorant about the characteristics of the environment he or 
she is going to face: all the rules initially generated have the highest generality, meaning 
that all their conditions are formed entirely by 1's. The action parts are instead randomly 
generated. 
The decision maker is also assumed to have limited computational capabilities, 
therefore the number of rules stored in the system at each moment is kept constant and 
relatively small in comparison to the complexity of the problem which is being tackled. 
This set of rules is processed in the following steps throughout the simulation process: 
1. Condition matching: a message is received from the environment which informs the 
system about the last state of the world. Such a message is compared to the condition of 
all the rules and the rules which are matched, i.e. those which apply to such a state of 
the world, enter the following step. 
2. Competition among matched rules: all the rules whose condition is satisfied compete 
in order to designate the one which is allowed to execute its action. To enter this 
competition each rule makes a bid based on its strength and on its specificity. In other 
words, the bid of each matched rule is proportional to its past usefulness (strength) and 
its relevance to the present situation (specificity): 
 
() ( ) 12 (, ) () , ii i Bid R t k k Specificity R Strength R t =+  
 
where k1 and k2 are constant coefficients. The winning rule is chosen randomly, with 
probabilities proportional to such bids. 
3. Action and strength updating: the winning rule executes the action indicated by its 
action part and has its own strength reduced by the amount of the bid and increased by 
the payoff that the action receives, given the occurrence of the “real” state of the world. 
If the j
th rule is the winner of the competition, we have:  
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() () (,1 ) , (, ) jj j Strength R t Strength R t Payoff t Bid R t += + −  
 
4.  Generation of new rules: the system must be able not only to select the most 
successful rules, but also to discover new ones. This is ensured by applying genetic 
operators which, by recombining and mutating elements of the already existing and 
most successful rules, introduce new ones which could improve the performance of the 
system. Thus new rules are constantly injected into the system and scope for new 
opportunities is always made available and such new rules are obtained by recombining 
and/or locally modifying existing knowledge. 
Genetic operators generate new rules which explore other possibilities in the vicinity of 
the currently most successful ones, in order to discover the elements which determine 
their success and exploit them. Search is not completely random but influenced by the 
system's past history. New rules take the place of the currently weakest ones, so that the 
total number of rules is kept constant. 
In Marengo (1992) and (1996) two genetic operators have been used for the condition 
and one for the action part. The latter is a simple type of local search and is simply a 
mutation in the “vicinity”: the action prescribed by the newly generated rule is chosen 
(randomly) in the close proximity of the one prescribed by the parent rule. More 
concretely, a mutation in the action part will probabilistically mutate the product type 
prescribed by the rule into one of the neighbouring product types. 
The two operators used for the condition part deserve more attention because of their 
role in modelling the evolution of the state of knowledge embedded into the system. 
They operate in opposite directions: 
-  Specification: a new condition is created which increases the specificity of the 
parent one. Wherever the parent condition presents a 1, this is mutated into a 0 with a 
given small probability;  
-   Generalization: the new condition decreases the specificity of the parent one. 
Wherever the latter presents a 0, this is mutated into a 1 with a given small probability.  
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Note that specification and generalization stand for two possible "cognitive" strategies 
which tend to drive the learning system towards, respectively, specific rules which 
apply to more specific states of the world and more general rules which instead cover a 
wider set of states of the world. Different degrees of specification and generalizations 
can be simulated both by means of different combinations of these two genetic 
operators and by varying the coefficient k2  with which specificity enters the bid 
equation: the higher this coefficient, the more highly specific rules will be likely to 
prevail over general ones. The simulations discussed below use a specificity coefficient 
to summarize the overall inclination of the system toward the search for specific rules, 
such coefficient will represent both the value k2 in the bid equation and the probability 
of application of the genetic operator specification every time the genetic operators 
routine is called. 
The model outlined so far can is used to study a variety of coordination problems 
conditional on changing environmental states.  Basically, an organization has to 
respond to an exogenous and changing environment by implementing some collective 
action.  
Suppose for instance that a firm can produce a certain number of product types, which 
are demanded by an exogenous market, and that the production process is divided into 
several parts, each of them being carried out by a different shop. The problem is 
therefore to detect correctly which product type is being demanded (state of the world) 
and to coordinate the actions of the shops so that the correct production process is 
implemented. 
More specifically, suppose that there exist eight possible product types, called 
respectively “1”, “2”,. . . , “8”. The firm's production possibilities set is represented by 
sequences of operations which can be of two types (A and B). Such sequences have all 
the same length and map into a product type, which is conventionally designated by the 
number of operations of type “1” which are utilized in its production. For example the 
product of type “8” is produced by all and only the production processes which contain 
eight operations of type “1”. Each production process is divided into two parts (of the 
same length) which are carried out separately by each of two shops. The problem of the  
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firm is therefore to forecast the product type which will be demanded by the market and 
to implement the correct production process by coordinating the operations of the two 
shops. The payoff is the following: if the firm produces the correct product type it 
receives a payoff of 5 units; if it does not produce the correct output it receives a 
negative payoff, given by the distance of the actual product type from the required one 
(for example, if the market demands type “7” but the firm produces type “5”, it will 
receive the payoff -2). 
Suppose now that the all the decision-making units which the organization is made of 
are represented by agents whose knowledge of the state of the world evolves exactly in 
the way presented above. 
A first bunch of simulations test the behaviour of a simple but quite general 
organizational structure (visualized in Figure 1), composed by a "management" and two 
shops. The management observes the environmental message (the last state of the 
world), interprets it according to its, evolving, "model of  the world", and sends a 





Each of the two shops can, in general, observe three kinds of signals and develop an 
interpretative model for each them. These signals are, respectively, the environmental 
signal (last observed state of the world), the message sent by the management (and 
based on its own interpretation of the environment), and the signal sent by the other 
shop (i.e. its last action). The latter two messages are coordinating devices, respectively 
a centralized and a decentralized one, which allow the shops to coordinate their action, 
whereas the former allows the two shops to form their own independent (from the 
management's) model of the world. 
The weights with which these three types of messages enter the shops' decision 
processes define the organizational balance between differentiation and commonality of 
knowledge. Such weights are represented by the specificity coefficients which express 
the agent's search for a precise model which interprets the corresponding type of 
message. A high specificity coefficient for the shops' condition parts which classify 
messages coming from the environment (messages of type 1B in Figure 2) implies that 
shops are aiming at building a detailed individual model of the world. A low coefficient 
implies instead that shops do not pay much attention to the environment. When the 
coefficient is equal to zero we have an organization in which shops do not form any 
autonomous model of the world but rely entirely on the world's interpretation given by 
the management (messages of type 1 and 2). 
A high specificity coefficient for the condition part which classifies messages coming 
from the management (messages of type 2 in Figure 2) implies that shops attribute great 
importance to the correct interpretation of the coordinating messages which are sent by 
Figure 1. Organizational informational flows (Marengo,1992, 1996)  
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the management. A low coefficient implies instead that shops are not seeking careful 
coordination on the organizational collective knowledge. When the coefficient is equal 
to zero we have an organization without any form of centralized coordination, i.e. the 
management has no role. 
Finally, a high specificity coefficient for the condition part which classifies messages 
coming from the other shop (messages of type 3 in Figure 2) implies that shops are 
attaching high importance to mutual, decentralized coordination. When the coefficient is 
equal to zero we have an organization without any form of decentralized coordination, 
i.e. no inter-shop communication. 
Marengo (1992) and Marengo (1996) present a set of simulations, whose main results 
can be summarized as follows. 
In stationary environments, i.e. when the state of the world does not change, agents can 
achieve coordination without building any model of the environment and resorting only 
to trial-end-error with selection. If instead they try to learn, i.e. to build such a model 
and constantly improving it, they need also to learn a model for the interpretation of 
coordinating messages: messages 1 and/or 1B are not sufficient, and messages 2 or 3 are 
also needed. 
If the environment undergoes cyclical and predictable changes, high specificity 
coefficients on the shops' conditions which classify environmental messages (message 
1B) are needed in order to exploit the environ mental regularity. 
Shops need to have a direct access to environmental information in order to develop the 
necessary decentralized learning. 
Finally, if the environment undergoes frequent and unpredictable changes, the 
organization has to develop stable routines which give a “satisficing" average result in 
most conditions. In this case decentralized learning is detrimental, because the stability 
of such routine is continuously jeopardized by individual efforts to grasp the 
unpredictable environment. Shops should rely on the management's message. 
All in all, in order to exploit a regularly changing environment a high amount of 
knowledge about the environment itself is required: the model must distinguish between 
the states of the world and connect them diachronically.  
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It is not surprising therefore that the most appropriate organization in such 
circumstances is the one which, by partly decentralizing the acquisition of knowledge 
about the environment, can achieve higher levels of sophistication in its model of the 
world, provided the coordination mechanisms - which are here centralized -  are 
powerful enough to enable the organization to solve conflicts of representations. On the 
other hand, this very decentralization of the acquisition of knowledge can be a source of 
loss when it is more profitable for the organization to cling to a robust and stable set of 
routines. This situation requires strong coordination in order to make the entire 
organization implement coherently such a set of robust routines. Autonomous and 
decentralized experimentation can only disrupt such a coherence. 
In our view, one ought to consider the foregoing models as a template for a largely 
unexplored family of exercises which takes seriously on board (i) informational 
imperfections; (ii) "boundedly rational" information processing; (iii) adaptive learning; 
and (iv) inter-organizational differences in information channels and decision rules.   
Indeed in these types of exercises, "balckboxing" is reduced to a minimum in so far as 
flows of information and decision acts are explicitly modelled.  The downside sets 
precisely in the associated difficulty in identifying robust traits of whatever 
organizational arrangements which yield revealed "better" or "worse" performances. 
 
3.  Models of evolution in the space of "traits" and problem solving  
In the last few years a new family of evolutionary models of organizations has 
developed inspired by biologist Stuart Kauffman's so-called “NK model” (Kauffman 
1993). His model of selection and adaptation in complex environments represents 
evolving entities characterized by non-linear interactions among their elements. 
Kauffman developed the so called “NK-model” primarily to deal with the evolution of 
populations of biological entities described by a string of "genes", but its formal 
structure allows for various applications in other domains. The model, indeed, has lent 
itself to a growing number of applications, extensions and modifications within the 
realm of organization studies. In this section we will review some of them, well short of  
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a comprehensive survey, with the primary purpose to flag some of the main results and 
incumbent challenges. 
3.1.1  Organizational dynamics on complex selection landscapes 
With such a purpose let us build on one of the earliest attempt to apply the "NK" 
approach to organizational analysis, presented by Levinthal (1997), who assumes that 
an organization can be represented as a string of (binary) traits (e.g. policies, rules, 
routines, standard operating procedures, etc.) linked together by a thread of 
interdependencies which map into an equally stylized environment delivering 
performance feedbacks which select in favor/against such configuration of traits..  More 
formally, an organization is described by a string of N loci which refer to the set of 
elements (i=1…N .that make up the system. For each element i, there exist Ai possible 
states
3. The set of all possible configurations (strings) of system’s elements A1× A2 ×… 
AN  is called the possibility space of a system.  
Next, define a fitness function F: A1× A2 ×… AN  → [0,1] which assigns a (normalized) 
real number to each possible string as a measure of its relative performance.  
The distribution of fitness values to all possible configuration defines the fitness 
landscape of the system. This landscape can be explored in search for the configuration 
with the maximum fitness value, moving from one configuration (a point in the fitness 
landscape) to another, by changing the value of one element. This “adaptive walk” ends 
when a configuration is reached which has not immediate neighbours with better fitness. 
Of course, if the "fitness contribution" of each trait were perfectly decomposable – as it 
is most obviously in e.g. standard (utterly "balckboxed") production function accounts – 
the usual "accounting" assumptions would be likely to apply: "more of x" contributes 
f(x) to the fitness of the entity, etc.  However if complementarities applies the map 
dramatically changes.  Here the fundamental parameter, the K-value, refers to the 
number of “epistatic” relations among elements (the structure of the system). The 
existence of these relations imply that the contribution of one element to the overall 
                                                 
3 In most applications and in all those we consider in this paper, the number of states is reduced – for the 
sake of simplicity – to two: Ai  = {0,1}.  
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fitness of the system is dependent both upon its own state and upon the state of K other 
elements. In the case, for example, of a system characterized by K=3, then the 
contribution of each element to the system’s performance depends on the value assumed 
by other three elements to which it is interrelated. Two limit cases of complexity can be 
distinguished: minimum complexity when K=0, and maximum complexity when K=N-1.  
Consider for a example a system characterized by N=3, Ai =[0,1] and K=0. Following 
Kauffman we draw the fitness values of elements for the two possible states randomly 
from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1. The fitness of the string as a whole is then 













In Levinthal’s simulations, populations of randomly generated structures (organizations) 
evolve on a fitness landscape, whereby the evolution is driven by variation selection and  
retention processes. 
Variation, i.e. the generation of variety, is provided by two mechanisms:  
-  local search: one-feature mutation with retention of strings with higher fitness 
value. 
-  Radical changes (“long jumps”): mutation of many (possibly all) features with 
retention of string with higher fitness value. 
Selection is obtained by simple birth and death process: organizations die with a 
probability inversely proportional to their relative fitness and are replaced by newly 
born ones. Some of these organization are randomly generated, owing possibly no 
resemblance to the existing ones, while others are replica of existing successful 
organization. 
Information passes among generations by mean of two mechanisms:  
-  retention: successful existing organizations have a high probability of surviving. 
Their features tend therefore to survive.   
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-  replication: some of the newly born organizations which replace bad performing 
ones, which are selected out, are copies of the most successful existing 
organizations. The features of the latter tend therefore to spread in the 
population. 
Suppose that a large population of randomly generated organizations evolves according 
to the mechanisms of selection and information passing just mentioned and suppose that 
instead variation can be only local, i.e. that only one bit at a time can be mutated for 
every organization. Local adaptation and selection will reduce the heterogeneity of the 
population: bad performers will be selected out and replaced by copies of good 
performers. In the meantime good performers will climb with local mutations the fitness 
peaks they are located on. 
However the final outcome of the evolution will crucially depend on the value of K, i.e. 
the complexity of the fitness landscape. With K=0 local adaptation will quickly take all 
the organizations to the only global optimum: thus selection and adaptation will 
completely wipe out the initial heterogeneity of the population and cause a fast 
convergence to unique optimal organizational form. For higher values of K the 
landscape will display an increasing number of local optima on which subset of 
organizations will converge according to their initial configuration. Selection and 
adaptation will reduce the heterogeneity but will never make it disappear. 
This result, rather obvious in this framework, must not be overlooked, as it provides a 
simple and intuitive explanation of the persistence of heterogeneity among firms, a 
piece of evidence widely reported by the literature but at odds with neoclassical theory, 
according to which deviations from the only best practice should be only a transient 
property inevitably due to fade out as market selection forces operate. Note also that as 
K increases not only does the number of local optima increase, but also the size of the 
basin of attraction of each of them will shrink. It is possible therefore that none of the 
organizations is located in the basin of attraction of the global optimum and therefore no 
organization will ever find the globally optimum configuration. 
In complex environment diversity of form can also emerge out of homogeneity. 
Levinthal (1997) that even if we start from a population of homogeneous organizations,  
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because of random local search they start mutating in different directions in the 
landscape. If K> 0 such initial random mutations will take organizations in the basins of 
attraction of different local optima. Selection and adaptation will only partially reduce 
such diversity. 
If organizations can perform more radical changes (“long jumps”), i.e. mutate many 
(possibly all) features, also with large K heterogeneity tends - though very slowly - to 
disappear, as organization located on sub-optimal peaks can always perform -though 
with low probability - a radical mutation which allows them to jump on a higher fitness 
peak, until they rich the highest one of the global optimum. However if N is large 
enough such a possibility may have a very low probability and not make any real impact 
on the medium term evolution of the population. 
Consider now the case of environmental changes, which can be modelled by re-drawing 
the fitness contributions of some features after the population has evolved and stabilized 
over the local optima. Suppose that such a change concerns only one feature and K=0, 
then if the fitness contribution of only one attribute is modified, the global optimum will 
either remain where it was or move to a point which is at most one mutation away. 
Thus, if the population has already evolved and located on the global optimum, it can 
easily and quickly adapt and move to the new global optimum. Simulations show that 
all incumbent organizations survive to such an environmental change. 
If instead the complexity of the landscape is high (K 〉〉 0), even the modification of the 
fitness contribution of just one attribute can cause a large alteration of its shape. In high 
dimensional landscapes with large N local optima can move far away. This implies that 
a population which has settled on the local optima of the initial landscape will find it 
much more difficult to adapt to the change. Mortality of incumbents will rapidly rise as 
K increases. 
If the environment changes more radically, i.e. the fitness contributions of many 
(possibly all) the attributes are re-drawn, we get a different picture. As we have already 
argued, in a “simple” landscape with K = 0 all organizations quickly converge to the 
same configuration, which correspond to the unique global optimum and diversity dies 
out. If a dramatic environmental shock happens for which the global optimum moves  
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far away from its initial position, the entire population will find itself in a low fitness 
area of the landscape and incumbent organizations will be outperformed by newly 
created ones with random configuration. 
If, on the contrary, K is high the population remains distributed over a large number of 
local optima and there is a high likelihood that a subset of the population will find itself 
in or close to a high fitness portion of the landscape after the environmental shock has 
occurred. Preserving diversity helps the population adapt to dramatic environmental 
changes. 
Levinthal’s analysis has been expanded and broadened by a few papers which have 
further studied the relationship between organizational design and environmental 
complexity and turbulence. Among them, interesting results have been obtained by 
Rivkin and Siggelkow (cf. Rivkin and Siggelkow (2002), (2003), Siggelkow and Rivkin 
(2005)). Differently from Levinthal (1997) they introduce a representation of an 
organizational structure in a NK-type model. Decisions over the N policies (bits of the 
string) are allocated among different departments and a superordinate CEO takes the 
function of coordinating departmental decisions. 
More in detail, each department controls a given number of policies and in engaged in 
increasing the fitness contribution of such policies (climbing the departmental 
“subscape”, i.e. the landscape generated by only those policies). As – in general – any 
policy change in one department changes also the other departments’ fitness values, 
each department also attaches some weight to fitness changes of other departments. This 
weight, ranging from 0 to 1, is a model parameter which stands for the degree of inter-
department coordination. 
Finally, the organization has a CEO in charge endowed with the power of taking the 
final decisions by selecting departments’ proposals. For this purpose, the CEO asks 
each department i to suggest its most preferred alternatives and selects those 
combination of departments’ proposals which deliver the highest organizational fitness. 
The parameters di measure the degree of CEO discretion: at one extreme, if  di is equal 
to one for all departments, then the CEO can simply automatically approve each 
department’s most preferred alternative, without any de facto selection power. At the  
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other extreme, if  di is equal to the number of all envisageable alternatives for all 
departments, then the CEO has a de facto full discretionary control over all policies.  
This interplay between departments and CEO creates what the authors call a set of 
“sticking points”, i.e. organizational configurations to which no alternative exists which 
can go through the approval of all subjects involved. Sticking points do not necessarily 
correspond to organizational local optima, as on one side cross-vetoes of departments 
and CEO can prevent an improvement which would increase the fitness of the 
organization and, on the other side, a department can, in some circumstances, 
implement a change which is beneficial for itself but not for the entire organization and 
therefore unlock the organization from local optima. 
Divergence between the set of local optima and the set of sticking points is larger when 
the following conditions are met: 
1.  decisions are allocated among a larger number of departments; 
2. interdependencies among policies allocated to different departments are 
stronger; 
3.  the weight which each department attributes to other departments’ fitness is 
lower; 
4.  the larger the number of proposal the CEO receives from departments if the 
latter give high weight to others’ fitness. 
 
3.1.2  Cognitive and experiential search 
 
Gavetti and Levinthal (2000) deepen the analysis of search processes by looking at the 
relations between forward-looking and backward-looking search and their effects on the 
performance of the system. The two search processes refer to two logics of action 
derived by Herbert Simon’s (1955) definition of bounded rationality. On the one side 
there is the cognitive and forward-looking choice based on off-line evaluation of a 
broad set of alternatives, even very distant from current behavior; on the other side there 
is experiential choice based on on-line evaluation of a limited set of alternatives which 
are close to current behavior.   
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In Gavetti and Levithal’s model, the organization chooses a policy on the basis of a 
simplified cognition of its environment. This choice results in the identification of a set 
of possible actions (a template) which cannot be directly translated into actions. In this 
context, existing practices function as defaults for elements not specified by the 
cognitive representation and they allow for the identification of a specific course of 
action. Thus, it may happen that actors with the same cognition may engage in different 
behaviors.  
This concept are translated into a NK-based model in which organization’s limited 
cognition corresponds to a simplified representation of the fitness landscape which is  
assumed to be of lower dimensionality than the actual landscape (N1<N), but 
nonetheless grounded in it. This idea is captured by assuming that for each point of the 
cognitive representation (of the perceived landscape) there are 2
N-N1 points in the actual 
fitness landscape. The fitness value assigned to each point of the cognitive corresponds 
to the average fitness values of these 2
N-N1 point. Thus for each point in the perceived 
landscape there are 2
N-N1 arrays in the actual landscape.  
Organization which choose according to its cognitive representation explores regions, 
and not single points, of the landscape. And the width of these regions depends on the 
crudeness of the representation. When both cognitive and experiential search are at 
work, organization identifies a pick in its perceived N1-dimensional landscape (by 
cognitive or off-line search) and then explores the remaining N-N1 alternatives through 
a local (or on-line) search based on one bit-mutations. The role of experiential search 
becomes more and more important as the crudeness of the cognitive representation 
increases. What is important to notice is the role of the initial cognitive search in 
identifying, on average, superior basins of attractions. Indeed, the global pick of the 
representation generally corresponds to an attractive region of the actual landscape. 
Initial off-line search then helps in finding a good position from which the local search 
can start. 
Gavetti and Levinthal show that in a context of competitive ecology in which low 
performance organizations are selected out and are replaced by new born ones, 
organizations which adopt a joint cognitive and experiential search dominated the  
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population. This becomes particularly clear with rugged actual landscapes, in which 
organizations which use  purely experiential search are trapped into local optima. 
In this framework what are the effects of adaptation through changes in the cognitive 
representation? Gavetti and Levinthal (2002) consider these effects both in the case of 
purely cognitive search and in that of  joint cognitive and experiential search, also with 
changes in the actual  fitness landscape. In the case of pure cognitive representation the 
organization choose an alternative on the basis of its understanding of the payoffs as 
characterized by a set of N1 attributes. In this case the effects of changes in the 
representation depends on the complexity of the landscape (the value of K). If K is high 
these changes may produce good performances, as they can compensate for a poor 
representation of the landscape. Of course these effects depend on the nature of the 
change: in the case of purely off-line search, organizations which perform better are 
those who adopt a semi-intelligent change process, changing  their representation with a 
probability which is inversely-proportional to their fitness and imitating leading 
organizations in the population. But if one considers organizations which  use joint off-
line and on-line search,  the shift to a new representation could destroy the accumulated 
experience. In this context the best performances is obtained in the case of no changes at 
all, while no differences exist between organizations which adopt  semi-intelligent 
changes and organizations which adopt a random change procedure.  
Changes in the representation can enhance organization’s performance when the 
landscape itself changes as the new representation may more effectively identify new 
superior basin of attraction, and this can compensate for the loss of experiential wisdom.  
Gavetti and Levinthal (2002) shed light on the role of cognitive search in conditioning  
experiential leaning by constraining the local search to the most promising regions of 
the landscapes.  The analysis of the interplay between the two logics of action 
indifferent contexts  represents a significant progress with respect to Levinthal’s (1997) 
model in which organizational search process is reduced either to “one-bit mutation” 
search or to totally random “big jumps” .   
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A further step in the direction of opening up the “organizational problem solving black 
box” entails an explicit representation of organizational  problem solving procedures, 
there emergence and their dynamics. 
 
 
3.1.3  Problem solving organization and the division of labor 
Following Simon (1981), Marengo and Dosi (2005)
4 focus on strategies for the 
reduction of problem complexity through a division of problem solving labor, that 
results in the decomposition of large and complex problems into smaller sub-problems 
which can be solved independently. They argue that the deriving process of division of 
labour is a major and long neglected driving force in explaining economic organization. 
In particular, traditional organizational economics has concentrated upon the 
governance of transaction and contractual relations between given “technologically 
separable” units, but does not tackle the analysis of where such technologically 
separable units come from nor, more importantly, of whether organizational structures 
have some  
This issue is relevant both because it is clear that most processes of division of labour 
take place within organizations and, relatedly, because empirical evidence shows that 
most of the times technologies are born in a highly integrated fashion, then they 
possibly undergo vertical disintegration (and sometimes a subsequent re-integration) 
along the lines defined by the within-firm division of labour. In other words, we could 
say that “in the origin there were organizations” and then markets develop along the 
lines defined by the division of labour within firms, rather than the other way round as 
postulated by transaction costs economics. 
Marengo and Dosi (2005) put forward a problem-solving approach to economic 
organization where different organizational structures (with varying degrees of vertical 
integration) are compared in  terms of their dynamic problem-solving properties 
determined by division of labour and task decomposition. The basic assumption is that 
                                                 
4 See also Marengo et al. 2000.  
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solving a given problem requires the coordination of N atomic “elements” or “actions” 
or “pieces of knowledge”, which we can generically call components, each of which can 
assume some number of alternative states. The one-bit mutation algorithm at the basis 
of the NK model, can be conceived as a particular case in which the problem is fully 
decomposed and the search process is fully decentralized: each sub-problem consist of a 
single component (bit). As showed by Kaufmann (1993), this algorithm is very quick, 
but it allows to reach only the local optimum whose basin of attraction contain the 
initial configuration. On the opposite there is the case of no decomposition at all, or 
total centralization, corresponding to a strategy in which all the components (bits) are 
simultaneously mutated. In this case the global optimum can be reached by exploring all 
the possible configurations. In between there are all the other possible divisions of labor 
strategies. 
Note that the effectiveness of the decomposition, in terms of system optimization, is 
strongly affected by the existence of interdependences among the components of the 
problem: separating interdependent components and then solving each sub-problem 
independently will prevent overall optimization. Note also that, as pointed out by 
Simon, because of the opaqueness of the interrelations between component, optimal 
decomposition – a division of labor that separate into sub-problems only the 
components that are independent from each other - cannot be achieved by bounded 
rational agents that normally are bound to adopt near-decompositions, trying to put 
together within the same sub-problem only those components whose interdependences 
are important for the performance of the system. 
A last, but central aspect that must be considered is the fact the that the search space in 
not given exogenously, but is constructed by individuals that possess subjective 
representations of the structure of the problem. The point is that the distance between 
the real structure of the problem (its real decomposition) and the subjective 
representation that individuals have of it has a dramatic effect on the problem solving 
outcome. 
More formally, one can characterize a problem by the following elements:  
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The set of components: C={c1,c2, …, cN}, where each component can take one out of a 
final number of states. Normally, without loss of generality, a binary set of components 
is assumed for simplicity: ci ∈ {0,1} ∀i. 
A configuration, that is a possible solution to the problem, is a string 
i
N
i i i c c c x ... 2 1 =  
The set of configurations:  } ,..., , {
2 2 1
N
x x x X =  
An ordering over the set of possible configurations: we write x





i is weakly (or strictly) preferred to x
j. 
A problem is defined by the pair (X, ≥). 
As the size of the set of configurations is exponential in the number of components, 
whenever the latter is large, the state space of the problem becomes much too vast to be  
extensively searched by agents with bounded computational capabilities. One way of 
reducing its size is to decompose
5 it into sub-spaces. 
Let I={1,2,…,N} be the set of indexes and let a block
6 di ⊆ I be a non-empty subset of 
it, we call the size of block di its cardinality |di|. Let us define a decomposition of the 
problem (X,≥) as a set of blocks: 






Note that a decomposition does not necessarily have to be a partition. 
Given a configuration x
i and a block dj, the block-configuration x
i(dj) is the substring of 
length |dj| containing the components of configuration x








j d x x x d x
| | 1 1 ... ) ( =      j h d j ∈ ∀  
We also use the notation x
i(d-j) to indicate the substring of length N-|dj| containing the 
components of configuration x
i not belonging to block dj. 
                                                 
5 A decomposition can be considered as a particular case of search heuristics: search heuristics are, in fact, 
ways of reducing the number of configurations to be considered in a search process. 
6 Blocks in our model can be considered as a formalization of the notion of modules used by the flourishing 
literature on modularity in technologies and organizations (Baldwin and Clark, 2000) and decomposition 
schemes are a formalization of the notion of system architecture which defines the set of modules in which a 
technological system or an organization are decomposed.  
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Two block-configurations can be united into a larger block-configuration by means of 
the ∨ operator so defined: x(dj) ∨ y(dh) = z(dj∪dh) where zk = xk if k∈dj and zk = yk if 
k∈dh 
Let us then define the size of a decomposition as the size of its largest defining block: 
|D|= max{|d1|,|d2|, …, |dk|} 
Coordination among blocks in a decomposition may either take place through market-
like mechanisms or via other organizational arrangements (e.g. hierarchies). 
Dynamically, when a new configuration appears, it is tested against the existing one 
according to its relative performance. The two configurations are compared in terms of 
their ranks and the superior one is selected, while the other one is discarded. 
More precisely, let us assume that the current configuration is x
i and take block dh with 
its current block-configuration x
i(dh). Let us now consider a new configuration x
j(dh) for 







j(dh) is selected and the new configuration x
j(dh) ∨ x
i(d-h) is kept in place of x
i, 
otherwise x
j(dh) is discarded and x
i is kept. 
It might help to think in terms of a given division of labor structure (the decomposition 
scheme) within firms, whereby individual workers and organizational sub-units 
specialize in various segments of the production process (a single block). 
Decompositions, however, sometimes determine also the boundaries across independent 
organizations specialized in different segments of the whole production sequence. 
Note that, dynamically, different inter-organizational decompositions entail different 
degrees of decentralization of the search process. The finer the inter-organizational 
decompositions, the smaller the portion of the search space which is being explored by 
local variational mechanisms and tested by market selection. Thus there is inevitably a 
trade-off: finer decompositions and more decentralization make search and adaptation 
faster (if the decomposition is the finest, search time is linear in N), but on the other 
hand, they explore smaller and smaller portions of the search space, thus decreasing the 
likelihood that optimal (or even good) solutions are ever generated and tested.  
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A decomposition is a sort of template which determines how new configurations are 
generated and can be tested afterward by the selection mechanism. In large search 
spaces in which only a very small subset of all possible configurations can be generated 
and undergo testing, the procedure employed to generate such new configurations plays 
a key role in defining the set of attainable final configurations. 
We will assume that boundedly rational agents can only search locally in directions  
which are given by the decomposition: new configurations are generated and tested in 
the neighborhood of the given one, where neighbors are new configurations obtained by 
changing some (possibly all) components within a given block. 
Given a decomposition D={d1,d2, … ,dk}, we say that a configuration x
i is a preferred 
neighbor or simply a neighbor of configuration x
j with respect to a block dh ∈ D if the 
following three conditions hold: 
1. 





k x x =     h d k ∉ ∀  
3. 
j i x x ≠  
Conditions 2 and 3 require that the two configurations differ only by components which 
belong to block dh. According to the definition, a neighbor can be reached from a given 
configuration through the operation of a single decentralized coordination mechanism. 
We call Hi(x,di) the set of neighbors of a configuration x for block di. 
The set of best neighbors Bi(x,di) ⊆ Hi(x,di) of a configuration x for block di is the set of 
the most preferred configurations in the set of neighbors: 
Bi(x,di)={y ∈ Hi(x,di)  such that  y ≥ z    ∀ z ∈ Hi(x,di)} 
By extension from single blocks to entire decompositions, we can give the following 




i i d x H D x H
1




A configuration is a local optimum for the decomposition D if there does not exist a 
configuration y such that y ∈ H(x,D) and y > x.  
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A search path or, for short, a path P(x
i,D) from a configuration x
i and for a 
decomposition D is a sequence, starting from x









j is reachable from another configuration x
i and for decomposition D if 
there exists a path P(x




j is a local optimum for decomposition D; we call the basin of 
attraction of x




j,D)={y, such that  ∃ P(y,D) with  x
j ∈ P(y,D)} 
Now let x
0 be the global optimum and let Z ⊆ X with x
0 ∈ Z. We say that the problem 
(X,≥) is locally decomposable in Z by  decomposition D if Z ⊆ Ψ(x
0,D). If Z=X, we say 
that the problem is globally decomposable by decomposition D. 
We can soften the perfect decomposability requirement into one of near-
decomposability: we no longer require the problem to be decomposed into completely 
separated sub-problems, i.e. sub-problems which fully contain all interdependencies, but 
we might be happy to find sub-problems which contain the most relevant 
interdependencies, while less relevant ones can persist across sub-problems. In this way, 
optimizing each sub-problem independently will not necessarily lead to the global 
optimum, but to a “good” solution. In other words, we construct near-decompositions 
which give a precise measure of the trade-off between decentralization and optimality: 
higher degrees of decentralization, while generally displaying a higher adaptation speed, 
are likely to be obtained at the expense of the asymptotic optimality of the solutions 
which can be reached. 
Let us arrange all the configurations in X by descending rank X={x
0,x
1, x
2,…} where  
x
i ≥ x
i+1, and let Xµ = {x
0,x
1, … ,x
µ-1} be the ordered set of the best µ configurations. 
We say that Xµ is reachable from a configuration y ∉ Xµ and for decomposition D if 
there exists a configuration x
i ∈Xµ such that x
i ∈P(y,D). 
We call the basin of attraction Ψ(Xµ,D) of Xµ for decomposition D the set of all 
configurations from which Xµ is reachable. If Ψ(Xµ,D) = X we say that D is a µ-
decomposition for the problem. µ-decompositions of minimum size can be found  
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algorithmically with a straightforward generalization of the above algorithm which 
computes minimum size optimal decompositions. 
It is straightforward to show (Marengo and Dosi 2005) that as µ increases we can 
generally find finer near-decompositions. This shows that the organizational structure 
sets a balance in the trade-off between search and adaptation speed and optimality. It is 
easy to argue that in complex problem environments, characterized by strong and 
diffused interdependencies, such a trade-off will tend to produce organizational 
structures which are more decomposed and decentralized than what would be optimal 
given the interdependencies of the problem space.  
Different organizational forms implement different decomposition heuristics and might 
be characterized by different representations of the problem and therefore present 
different properties in terms of the effectiveness and efficiency of the derived search 
processes (see Marengo, Pasquali and Valente (2005) for a theoretical discussion of the 
topic). In particular a trade-off exists between complexity and optimality: a finer 
decomposition makes search faster, but the exploration of smaller portion of the search 
space reduces the likelihood to generate and then select an optimal solution. The 
application of these ideas to organizational design leads to the comparison, in terms of 
relative performance, between not decomposed tasks (organization-embodied) and 
decomposed tasks (coordinated via market-like mechanism or via simple organizations 
structured as sets of perfectly independent tasks). One of the main conclusions is that is 
that the advantages of decentralization (faster adaptation) usually imply a cost in terms 
of sub-optimality (impossibility to reach global optima). This casts strong doubts on the 
efficacy of market selection processes as substitutes for individual optimization: 
selection is not able to select out sub-optimal features nor to select for optimal ones if 
both are somehow complementary to each-other in actual organizations and 
technologies. 
Modeling the coupling mechanisms between capabilities and governance 
Marengo and Dosi (2005), as well as most of contributions of this genre, while 
concentrating on the problem-solving features of organizational dynamics, censor any  
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incentive compatibility issue. An attitude that, as noted above, is quite typical within the 
capability-based framework.  
There is nothing, however, preventing this type of analysis to go beyond the exclusive 
focus on firms as loci of coordination and as loci of creation, implementation, storage 
and diffusion of productive knowledge
7 and explicitly take on board the issues of 
incentive governance and control discussed qualitatively in Coriat and Dosi (1998). 
Attempts in this direction are formal analyses by Dosi, Levinthal and Marengo (2002; 
2003) which incorporate issues of conflict of interests, power and control over agents’ 
decisions within the analytical framework of Marengo and Dosi (2005) and Marengo et. 
al (2000) and to discuss the interaction between problem representation and incentive 
mechanisms. In particular, the double role of problem representation is stressed: on the 
one hand it defines the “cognitive” structure of the problem and the consequent 
decomposition which is adopted (definition of teams as subsets or blocks of 
components); on the other hand, it has important consequences for a reward mechanism 
based on the distinction between organization’s (system) and team’s (block) 
performance as it defines what organization conceives as a team. 
The analysis starts by considering the conflicts of interest among problem solving teams 
generated by the adoption team-level incentive mechanisms. While under a global 
reward an alternative (a particular configuration of sub-problem’s components) is 
selected if it improves the overall organization’s performance, with a team-level reward 
mechanism a would-be alternative is accepted if it enhances the performance of the unit 
even if it degrades the overall organization’s performance. It can be shown that if the 
organization’s representation of the problem is not correct (it does not correspond to the 
right structure of the problem in terms of interrelations among components) the 
adoption of a global reward allows the organization to reach a global optimum. But 
what is more interesting is that, even if the representation of the problem is not correct, 
                                                 
7 A more complete “co-evolutionary” picture is discussed by Dosi (1995). Organizations are assumed to be 
characterized by six correlated dimensions: the distribution of formal authority; the distribution of power; the 
incentive structure; the structure of information flows; the distribution of knowledge and competence. In this 
context organization dynamics can be conceived as a process of adaptation and selection according to 
multiple, and possibly conflicting, objective. 
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the adoption of a team-level reward structure tends, in the long run, to produce 
performances that are similar to the global- reward one. Thus, goal conflicts prevent 
organization to remain absorbed in local optima and act as substitute for a correct 
representation of the problem (Dosi, Levinthal and Marengo: 2002). 
Power is introduced by allowing one team (a block in the decomposition) to stop the 
mutation of any other blocks that decreases its own performance (veto power). The 
evidence suggests that, under specific conditions, the adoption of such a mechanism 
lead to good solutions. In particular the a team reward scheme with veto power is 
superior to the global reward structure when the organizational representation of the 
problem is based on a finer decomposition than the real one and the latter is not too 
complex. This is due to the fact that veto power interrupts the cycling among possible 
solutions generated by a team-based reward structure preserving the advantages in terms 
greater search effort which are typical of this reward mechanism. 
A principal-agent-like model of interaction is reproduced considering the case of control 
over the decisions of other organizational members by a principal, the residual claimant 
of the total payoff, who can “order” others to keep performing a given action or to 
switch to a different one. This activity is considered to have a cost which depends on the 
span of control, i.e. the dimension of each sub-unit, and it is higher when the principal 
wants to induce a change in agent’s action than when he wants to elicit the same 
behaviour (the principal’s profit is defined as the total output of the organization minus 
the “elicitation cost”). When actions are interdependent, the control function, as any 
other problem-solving activity, cannot be entirely decomposed. Thus, the interaction 
between a cognitive dimension and a control dimension has to be considered. The 
effects on total performance and the principal’s profit are analyzed considering four 
different cases: right, almost right, wrong and minimal (one-component units) perceived 
decomposition by agents, with reference to different decompositions of the underlying 
problem and the “correctness” of the decomposition itself. 
Obviously if the organizational decomposition is the “true” one, perfectly 
knowledgeable agents not facing any incentive compatibility problem would make 
costly control redundant. However, interestingly, when the organization has a wrong  
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representation of the problem space (and in particular underestimates the span of 
interdependencies), agents subject to costly control may generate a better performance 
then the one produced by perfectly ‘cooperative’ agents. 
Finally Dosi, Levinthal and Marengo (2002) analyze more explicitly the double role of 
problem representation. The work examines, in particular, by means of a simulation 
model, the relations between cognitive decompositions and operational decompositions. 
The former establish search heuristics and targets, whereas the latter implement search 
processes driven by those targets. The exercise shows that if cognitive decompositions 
are correct then it is efficient to have maximum division of labor at the operational 
level, as this increases speed and accuracy of adaptation to targets. On the contrary, if 
cognitive decompositions do not correspond to the “true” ones, coarser division of labor 





Parallel to the qualitative analyses of organizations as structured bundles of problem-
solving capabilities (for a critical review of the literature cf. Dosi, Faillo and Marengo, 
2006), a growing number of contributions have begun to offer formal accounts of such 
organizational properties and their dynamics. The formal instruments are diverse, and 
include NK models representing organizations as ensembles of interrelated “traits” 
mapping into some overall environmental fitness of the firm; classifiers system 
representations of the problem-solving procedures triggered by diverse internal or 
environmental states; decomposition schemes of Simonian ascendancy allowing the 
analysis of the performance properties of different “representations” in the problem-
solving space and different patterns of division of cognitive and operational labour. 
The results begin to highlight important comparative properties regarding, among other, 
the impact on problem-solving efficiency and learning of different forms of hierarchical 
governance, the dangers of lock-in associated with specific forms of adaptive learning,  
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the relative role of “online” vs. “offline” learning, the impact of the “cognitive maps” 
which organizations embody, the possible trade-offs between accuracy and speed of 
convergence associated with different “decomposition schemes”. 
In a nutshell, one has finally begun to develop formal instruments allowing exercises of 
comparative institutional analysis (cf. Aoki, 2001), focusing on the distinct properties of 
different forms of organization and accumulation of knowledge. It is a work which is 
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